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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the opening ceremony of the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, the popular 
German-American world music band Enigma performed the theme song 
for the event, “Return to Innocence.”  As the song resounded in millions of 
homes worldwide, members of the Amis tribe in Taiwan identified it as 
resembling a folk song that formed an integral part of their upbringing and 
culture.  Consequently, Enigma, Capitol-EMI Music, and Virgin Records 
were sued collectively for a hefty amount in royalties in U.S. district court.  
Eventually the parties reached an out of court settlement compelling 
Enigma to acknowledge the Amis people’s contribution to the song.1  
                                                          
* Lecturer in Sociology, National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata, India. 
** Final Year Student (LL.B.), National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata, India. 
The authors are grateful to Mr. Anirban Mazumder, Lecturer in Law, National 
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However, this is only a single fortunate case among hundreds of instances 
of cultural misappropriation that traditional communities suffer every day. 
Over the last two decades, the cultural rights of indigenous peoples have 
received increasing attention from the United Nations and, with the 
adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,2 have 
been recognized internationally as fundamental human rights.3  Traditional 
communities around the world regularly confront issues of cultural 
appropriation and cultural theft—be it through the fusion of traditional 
music with digital beats to produce chart-topping pop music albums, 
traditional painting techniques, and handicrafts mass-produced by non-
traditional means and sold as authentic, indigenous art being replicated on 
clothing, footwear, and carpets, or indigenous words and names being 
trademarked and used commercially.  The protection against such 
exploitation of traditional writings, languages, customs, songs, paintings, 
handicrafts, rituals and ceremonies, traditional medical knowledge, legends 
and myths, referred to collectively as traditional cultural expressions 
(“TCE”) or “folklore,”4 has emerged as an aspect of the cultural and 
intellectual property rights of indigenous people and is a key issue in the 
international arena. 
 
                                                          
Intellectual Property Law in India and Dr. Jolly Bagchi, singer, musician, and an expert 
on mass and folk songs from Bengal for her untiring discussions, suggestions, and 
articles on folk music. The authors also thank the organizers of the “IP/Gender: The 
Unmapped Connections” conference at the Washington College of Law, March 2007, 
for the opportunity to present this work, and to the participants of the conference for 
their feedback and encouragement. 
 1. See Nancy Guy, Abstract, Regaining Their Voices: Music, Cultural Ownership, 
and the Amis’ Copyright Struggle, in COPYRIGHT: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO OWN THE 
MUSIC?, available at http://orpheus.tamu.edu/pmssem/ copyright.html (noting that 
Enigma initially neither mentioned the tribe’s contribution nor paid any of its huge 
profits to the tribe). 
 2. See U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Hum. Rts. Council 
Res. 2006/2 (recognizing and reaffirming collective, indispensable rights that 
indigenous peoples possess, including the right to protect their cultural traditions). 
 3. Id. art. 12. 
 4. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization General 
Conference, Oct. 17 – Nov. 15, 1989, Recommendation on the Safeguarding of 
Traditional Culture and Folklore, 239, available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws 
/paris/html_eng/page1.shtml, 25 C/Resolutions + CORR. [hereinafter UNESCO 
Recommendation]  (explaining that 
[f]olklore (or traditional and popular culture) is the totality of tradition-based 
creations of a cultural community, expressed by a group or individuals and 
recognized as reflecting the expectations of a community in so far as they 
reflect its cultural and social identity; its standards and values are transmitted 
orally, by imitation or by other means. Its forms are, among others, language, 
literature, music, dance, games, mythology, rituals, customs, handicrafts, 
architecture and other arts. 
). 
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Developments in technology and the ease with which mass reproduction, 
broadcast, and distribution can be carried out in the digital era greatly 
increase the exploitation of folklore, which is expropriated blatantly and 
commercialized to suit the needs of the market.  The economic interests of 
indigenous communities suffer because no monetary returns from 
commercial exploitation of the cultural property are given to the traditional 
groups that develop and maintain it.5  The impact of such action is 
heightened further regarding developing countries, which are very rich in 
folklore but have particularly weak systems of intellectual and cultural 
property protection.6  The situation in India is particularly complex, as the 
Indian government refuses to recognize traditional artisan communities or 
custodians of traditional knowledge and folklore as “indigenous” peoples.7 
India’s labor-intensive handicrafts trade, basically a cottage industry, is 
dispersed widely—located mainly in rural areas—and is the largest 
employer in the unorganized labor sector.  Behind the huge industry are 
millions of artisans who create the Indian handicrafts that are unique and 
immediately identifiable in the global market.  In this paper, the authors 
study three specific cultural expressions generated by women in traditional 
communities located in the eastern part of India and the exploitation 
suffered by each.  The first is the case of the kantha-stitch industry in West 
Bengal8 and Bangladesh, which is a specific kind of decorative embroidery 
done only by the women of Bengal.9  The kantha-stitch industry has 
emerged as a highly lucrative industry, operating as an informal sector in 
India.10  However, over time fashion designers have come to stylize and 
innovatively apply the kantha technique on all kinds of apparel and 
accessories that are immensely popular in the market, thus, grossing 
millions for the fashion industry.  The women who create the exquisite 
patterns, after laboring for days, however, receive meager remuneration 
and no recognition for their art.  This is a classic instance of exploitation of 
traditional cultural expression that brings into sharp focus the issues of 
                                                          
 5. P. Kher, Towards Folklore Protection 2005 (30) PTC J-9 at J-10. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Virginius Xaxa, Tribes as Indigenous People of India, 34 ECON. & POL. 
WKLY. 3589, 3590 (1999) (discussing the indifference of the Indian government to the 
use of the term “indigenous” prior to the international recognition of the rights of 
indigenous people, and stating that the government now only approves of the term 
“indigenous” in rare circumstances, when referring to “people that have been subjected 
to domination and subjugation”). 
 8. A state located in the east of India, sharing borders with Bangladesh. 
 9. After the Partition of India in 1947, the Province of Bengal was divided into 
East Bengal (which later became the country of Bangladesh) and West Bengal, a state 
in the Union of India. 
 10. See generally Ulan Switucha, Nakshi Kantha: A Study Group Presentation, 12 
TEXTILE SOCIETY OF HONG KONG 7 (2004). 
3
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ownership and authorship of indigenous intellectual property. 
The second TCE this Article analyzes is the Madhubani painting—one 
of the most widely exported art products from India.  The Madhubani is a 
distinctive kind of painting using line drawings and vegetable dyes created 
by rural women from the Chota Nagpur Plateau and Chattisgarh areas in 
the state of Bihar located in eastern India.11  Apart from the problem of 
artistic non-recognition, as in the case of the kantha industry, the threat of 
fakes is paramount in this instance because cheap imitations flood both 
domestic and international markets. 
Finally, this Article explores the issue of commercial exploitation of 
TCE in the area of folk music, illustrating the problem by focusing on 
contemporary Bengali pop, which is based largely on blatant 
misappropriation of folk tunes and songs.  The core of the problem in the 
case of folk music protection, unlike in folk art, is the absence of fixation, 
leading to mutilation and distortion of folk music apart from non-
recognition of folk artists.  Issues of moral rights and duration of protection 
are problems that find relevance in each of the areas described above. 
This Article argues that the existing regime of intellectual property is 
grossly inadequate for protecting traditional cultural expressions, and must 
be suitably expanded to incorporate a human rights understanding to fully 
accommodate the interests of traditional and indigenous communities.  
Secondly, although the protection of intellectual property rights for 
indigenous communities has been read into indigenous peoples’ rights in 
international human rights instruments, and has also been addressed by 
specific declarations of indigenous peoples,12 these protections are not 
suitable for the Indian experience because the Indian government does not 
recognize traditional Indian artisan communities as indigenous peoples.  
Finally, even if intellectual property laws granted TCEs appropriate 
protection, the traditional knowledge and cultural expressions of women 
within patriarchal traditional communities would still remain unrecognized 
and unrewarded.  Therefore, this Article asserts that any legal or 
                                                          
 11. See generally Jagdish J. Chavda, The Narrative Paintings of India’s Jitwarpuri 
Women, 11 WOMAN’S ART J. 26 (1990). 
 12. See John Hunter & Chris Jones, Bioprospecting and Indigenous Knowledge in 
Australia: Valuing Indigenous Spiritual Knowledge and Its Implications for Intergrated 
Legal Regimes, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
LAW, available at http://law.wustl.edu/centeris/Papers/Biodiversity/PDFWrdDoc/ 
HunterJonesfinaldraft.doc (quoting the Julayinbul Statement on Indigenous Intellectual 
Property Rights (1993)); see also HUM. RTS. COUNCIL RES. 2006/2, supra note 2; 
International Consultation on Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity, Sept. 30, 
1994, available at http://www/austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AILR/2001/11.html 
[hereinafter ICIPRB]; First Int’l Conference on the Cultural & Intellectual Property 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Whakatane, N.Z., June 12-18, 1993, The Mataatua 
Declaration on the Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
preamble [hereinafter Mataatua Declaration]. 
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institutional framework developed to address this issue must accord due 
recognition to the contribution of women within the community towards 
their own creations. 
II. LOCATING CULTURAL RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE WITHIN THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 
A.  International Human Rights Law and the Indigenous 
The issue of cultural and intellectual property rights of indigenous 
communities has received increasing global attention due to a focus by the 
United Nations on this area in the last twenty-five years.13  The area of 
TCE protection is of particular significance because this is the only form of 
intellectual property for which protection has been sought under the human 
rights framework as well.  The United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (“WIPO”) have been addressing the ways in which the art and 
cultural expressions of indigenous peoples can be granted international 
protection by modifying the international intellectual property regime.  In 
addition, the right of indigenous peoples to protect and own their cultural 
property has been read into a number of associated human rights addressed 
in various international instruments. 
Cultural Rights of Minorities—The first of these is the Cultural Rights 
of Minorities, recognized under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, enacted in 1966, which provides that: “In those States in 
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to 
such minorities shall not be deprived of the right, in community with other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion or to use their own language.”14 
Right to Self-Identification—The International Labor Organization 
(“ILO”) Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries,15 adopted in 1991, called attention to the distinctive 
                                                          
 13. The United Nations has made a series of efforts to address this issue since it set 
up the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples in 1982.  See, e.g., MODEL PROVISIONS 
FOR NATIONAL LAWS ON THE PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION OF FOLKLORE AGAINST 
ILLICIT EXPLOITATION AND OTHER PREJUDICIAL ACTIONS (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Org. & World Intellectual Property Org. 1985), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0006/000637/063799eb.pdf [hereinafter UNESCO-
WIPO Model Provisions]; Hum. Rts. Council Res. 2006/2, supra note 2. 
 14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 15. See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, ILO Conv. 169, entered into force Sept. 5, 1991, art. 8, reprinted in 28 
I.L.M. 1382 (1989), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ instree/r1citp.htm. 
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contribution of indigenous peoples to cultural diversity16 and affirmed the 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-identification.17  The Convention asserted 
that this right to self-identification includes the rights of indigenous peoples 
to their intangible cultural, scientific, and intellectual resources.18 
Right of Indigenous People to Self-Determination—The First 
International Conference on the Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, convened by the nine Tribes of Mataatua in New 
Zealand in 1993, resulted in the Mataatua Declaration on the Cultural and 
Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“Declaration”).19  This 
instrument asserted that protection of the rights of indigenous peoples with 
respect to their traditional knowledge, cultural expressions, and all other 
forms of cultural property was an aspect of the right to self-determination.20 
The Declaration affirmed that indigenous populations have the 
fundamental right to define and control their traditional and cultural 
knowledge, but provided that as long as the international community 
guaranteed and upheld this right, they will offer the benefits of their 
traditional knowledge to all humanity.21 
Right to Practice Cultural Traditions—The promulgation of a 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples resulted from the United 
Nations International Year for the World’s Indigenous Peoples.  Article 12 
of the Declaration recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to practice 
and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs, including the right 
. . . to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future 
manifestations of their cultures, such as . . . artifacts, designs, 
ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature, 
as well as the right to the restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and 
spiritual property taken without their free and informed consent or in 
violation of their laws, traditions and customs.22 
Article 29 of the Declaration further recognizes the entitlement of 
indigenous peoples “to the full ownership, control and protection of their 
cultural and intellectual property.”23  This is the first international 
                                                          
 16. Id. preamble. 
 17. Id. art. 1(2). 
 18. Id. art. 23 (recognizing that the right of indigenous peoples to maintain their 
culture and to achieve economic self-reliance and development is a fundamental human 
right). 
 19. Mataatua Declaration, supra note 12 (listing Japan, Australia, Cook Islands, 
Fiji, India, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Surinam, and the United States as attendees). 
 20. Id. preamble. 
 21. Id. 
 22. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 12, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994). 
 23. Id. art. 29. 
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convention to specifically articulate the cultural rights of indigenous people 
as integral human rights. 
The recognition of cultural rights of indigenous peoples in international 
human rights documents represents the global shift in perception, 
acknowledging the dangers of distorting indigenous cultural systems by 
adjusting them to the prevailing intellectual property regime.  Further, it 
reflects the significance of adequate protection of cultural property to the 
social and economic lives of indigenous communities.  However, despite 
these efforts to recognize the cultural integrity and cultural autonomy of 
indigenous peoples as human rights, and parallel attempts by UNESCO and 
WIPO to protect TCEs through international conventions, the intellectual 
property of indigenous peoples continues to be vulnerable to 
misappropriation.  This failure of existing intellectual property regimes to 
protect indigenous interests may be attributed to the fact that intellectual 
property laws in general, and copyright laws in particular, do not 
incorporate a human rights understanding in their present form—especially 
in relation to indigenous populations—and are, in fact, antithetical to a 
human rights paradigm in many respects. 
B.  The “Indigenous” in India 
The term “indigenous” describes tribes or semi-tribal populations in 
independent countries who lived in the country prior to colonization or 
conquest by immigrants from outside the country or geographical region in 
question.24  These populations became increasingly marginalized after the 
conquest, which gradually led these people to develop particular social, 
economic, and cultural lifestyles distinct from those of the national 
mainstream.  Due to these distinctive traits, the application of generic 
domestic legislation does not suit such populations in the present day.  
Conceptualized in such terms, locating the indigenous in India is difficult.  
Many adivasis,25 as the indigenous are understood in India, were not the 
original settlers of the regions in which they are found now.  It is also 
difficult to make the claim that they were the only original inhabitants of 
India prior to the arrival of Aryans and that they have never migrated.26  
Furthermore, not all of these communities have been marginalized or 
subjugated by the mainstream population, and the immigrant colonial 
populations that initially dominated some of these groups are no longer 
present.  Hence there exists significant academic debate in India regarding 
the usage of the term “indigenous” and corresponding non-recognition of 
                                                          
 24. Xaxa, supra note 7, at 3590. 
 25. The term literally means “the first settlers” in Hindi—the national language of 
India. 
 26. Xaxa, supra note 7, at 3591. 
7
Goswani and Nandi: Presentation: Naming The Unnamed: Intellectual Property Rights of
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2008
    
264 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 16:2 
the same under domestic law.  As a result, despite the cultural and 
intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples finding recognition in 
international human rights instruments and in specific declarations of 
indigenous people, the application of these instruments in the Indian 
context is problematic. 
III. COMMUNITY INTERESTS V. THE COPYRIGHT REGIME: A CLASH OF 
IDEOLOGIES 
In the understanding of aboriginal, indigenous, or native peoples, or the 
“Fourth World” as some have collectively christened them,27 intellectual 
property rights are rooted in a concept of collective or communal 
intellectual property existing in perpetuity.28  In other words, such rights 
are not limited to the life of an individual creator plus some arbitrary 
number of years after his or her death.  To the indigenous peoples, a song, 
story, icon, or artwork does not belong to an individual but to the group as 
a collective whole determined by the customary laws of collective 
ownership of cultural property.29  Unlike the Western system, regulation of 
intellectual property creation and use within indigenous groups is not based 
on notions of individual talent and expression, but instead stems from a 
system of inherited rights and obligations. 
Unlike the Third World, indigenous nations do not constitute “States,” 
and as a result, they seldom participate on the international stage.  
Nonetheless, in 1994, indigenous peoples made efforts on an international 
platform to draft an instrument for the protection of these groups in the 
form of the International Covenant on the Rights of Indigenous Nations, 
which attempted to articulate a distinctive Fourth World approach to 
intellectual property rights.  Despite this attempt, folkloric rights continue 
to have no standing in the international courts.30  Typically, therefore, 
indigenous peoples have sought to protect folklore under the framework of 
intellectual property, within which they have considered copyright laws 
best suited to protect traditional cultural expressions.31  However, as several 
                                                          
 27. See generally GEORGE MANUEL, THE FOURTH WORLD: AN INDIAN REALITY 
(1974) (using for the first time the term “Fourth World”  to define “the indigenous 
peoples descended from a country’s aboriginal population and who today are 
completely or partly deprived of the right to their own territories and its riches”). 
 28. Harry Hillman Chartrand, Intellectual Property in the Global Village, 1 GOV’T 
INFO. IN CAN., 1995, available at http://library2.usask.ca/gic/v1n4/chartrand/chartrand. 
html. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Posting of Harry Hillman Chartrand to Intellectual Property Law Server, 
Copyright And The New World Economic Order, http://www.intelproplaw.com/Copy 
right/Forum/msg/498.shtml (last visted July 3, 1999). 
 31. See, e.g., KAMIL IDRIS, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION 
[WIPO], MINDING CULTURE: CASE-STUDIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
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authors have argued, the copyright regime in its present form is ill-
equipped to serve the interests of indigenous communities due to 
fundamental differences between the Western understanding of 
“protection” and the indigenous understanding of the same.32  While 
indigenous works are not excluded entirely from protection under the 
present copyright regime, it does not give them any kind of special 
protection either.  As of now, folk music, folk art, and other forms of 
folklore do not find special mention in any copyright statute in the world.33  
The Indian Copyright Act of 1957 is no different in this regard.  As 
illustrated below, the interests of traditional Indian communities in 
protecting their folklore clearly differ from the underlying precepts of the 
existing copyright law. 
A.  Authorship and Ownership 
Authorship and ownership are distinct concepts under copyright law and 
ownership of copyright in a work is independent of the ownership of the 
physical material in which the work is fixed.  The basic rule of ownership 
of literary, musical, or artistic property is that the author34 is the first owner 
of copyright in the work.35  This rule is subject to certain exceptions,36 none 
                                                          
TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS 10 (2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/ 
en/studies/cultural/minding-culture/studies/finalstudy.pdf; see also Yumbulul v. 
Aboriginal Artists Agency Ltd. (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481.  See generally Milpurrurru v. 
Indofurn Party Ltd. (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240 (Austl.). 
 32. See generally Kamal Puri, Preservation and Conservation of Expression of 
Folklore, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN LAW 511 
(David Vaver ed., Routledge 2006); Kher, supra note 5; G.C. O’Donnell, A Short Note 
on Anti-Copyright, AUSTRALIAN COPYRIGHT COUNCIL (1985). 
 33. See India Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957; India Code (1957), § 13.1 (ruling that 
copyright subsists in: (1) original literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works;         
(2) cinematograph films; and (3) sound recordings). 
 34. See id. § 2(d) (defining “author:” (1) in relation to literary or dramatic work, the 
author of the work; (2) in relation to musical work, the composer; (3) in relation to 
artistic work, other than a photograph, the artist; (4) in relation to cinematograph film, 
the producer; (5) in relation to photograph, the person who takes the photograph; (6) in 
relation to sound recording, the producer; and (7) in relation to any literary, dramatic, 
musical, or artistic work, which is computer-generated, the person who causes the work 
to be created); see also 9 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 548 (Butterworths, 4th ed. 
1973) (defining “author” as the person who actually writes, compiles, composes, or 
draws the work in question, although the idea of the work may have been suggested by 
another). 
 35. India Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957; India Code (1957) § 17. 
 36. See id. § 17(a)-(c) (stating the following exceptions to the author as first owner 
of copyright rule: (1) literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works made in the course of 
employment under a contract of service or a contract for service; (2) artistic works and 
cinematographic films made at the instance of any person or as against valuable 
consideration; (3) speeches delivered in public; and (4) government works and public 
works); see also Vicco Labs v. Art Commerica Adver. Pvt. Ltd. (2001) 7 S.C.C. 81, 93 
(India) (asserting that, in India, copyright or ownership rights in respect of any work 
created by another can be claimed only when the author creates it either in the course of 
employment, as an agent, at the instance of the claimant, or if the claimant has paid 
9
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of which apply in the case of indigenous folklore.  This basic rule is in 
stark contrast to customary practices of native artisan communities because 
indigenous artists traditionally do not sign their work.37  According to 
customary indigenous laws, a work created by one member usually is 
owned by the entire tribe or group, through an operation of collective 
ownership.38  The concept of “joint authorship” does exist in Indian 
copyright law,39 but one cannot apply it in the case of indigenous cultural 
property because such works are usually not a collaborative effort in which 
the contribution of one author can be separated from the other, but instead, 
it is something of a cumulative knowledge that finds expression over 
generations. 
In India, one example of blatant misappropriation of traditional 
communities’ intellectual property is that of clothing and draperies made 
by rural women using the kantha needlework.  The misappropriation takes 
place as a consequence of the inadequate protection afforded by the 
copyright laws of the country.  The kantha originated as a form of rough 
embroidery on blankets made of varying sizes and pieces of cloth held 
together by the simple running stitch for wrapping or laying down new 
born babies or as a wrap for adults.  Rural women outline patterns in black 
chain stitch and then fill in with running stitch in a different color.40  
Kantha motifs traditionally reflect rural scenes, such as birds, flowers, 
wedding ceremonies, mythologies, and legends.  The variation in style 
comes with the different ways in which the artists embroider the running 
stitch.  Even today the stitching pattern and embroidery styles of kantha 
weavers in Bangladesh and West Bengal are significantly unique and 
identifiable.  That speaks for the levels of sophistication of the art.41  A 
cultural expression generated exclusively by women,  kantha was never 
made for money, and its commercial use is a recent phenomenon.42  
Gradually, entrepreneurs from urban Bengal recognized the market for 
such ethnic goods and started buying the products from rural households.  
Several urban groups trained rural women in this craft who had little or no 
urban education and, over the course of time, it became a form of gainful 
                                                          
valuable consideration for the said work). 
 37. Puri, supra note 32, at 522. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See India Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957; India Code (1957), Preliminary § 2(z) 
(defining “work of joint authorship” as  a work produced by the collaboration of two or 
more authors in which the contribution of one author is not distinct from the 
contribution of other author or authors). 
 40. JOHN GILLOW & BRYAN SENTANCE, WORLD TEXTILES 163 (2005). 
 41. See generally Ulan Switucha, Nakshi Kantha – A Study Group Presentation, 12 
TEXTILE SOC’Y OF HONG KONG 7 (Summer 2004). 
 42. SashaWorld.com, Kantha, http://www.sashaworld.com/family/kantha.htm (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2007). 
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economic employment for these women.43 
The flip side of this development, however, is that women have lost 
control over the entire craft of kantha.  It gradually has emerged as an 
industry wherein urban designers and traders determine virtually every 
detail from designs and color schemes to marketing.  Women now produce 
on a mass scale and also cater to specific demands made by an urban upper 
middle class clientele.  Kantha embroidered apparel and artifacts exported 
on a global scale by government agencies and private entrepreneurs 
showcase Indian culture, but with heavy costs.  Women producers not only 
receive a mere fraction of the huge profits, but traditional motifs and styles 
of stitching that typified kantha are giving way rapidly to urban designs.  
Fortunately, the art does not run the risk of dying.  On the contrary, kantha 
products remain extremely popular.  In this case, the crux of the problem is 
that the women who produce the products do not sign their work, in 
accordance with tradition.  With the author of the work unknown, it 
becomes impossible to protect the interests of such authors under the 
existing copyright regime because first ownership of copyright devolves 
upon the author of the work, to whom all economic rights flowing from the 
copyright then accrue.  As a result of this artistic non-recognition, kantha 
artisans are reduced to mere trained weavers producing made-to-order 
products.  Under the existing copyright regime, women of rural Bengal 
cannot conceive of claiming ownership rights over this artistic expression 
and have to be satisfied with minimal economic gains. 
B.  Originality of Expression 
The requirement of originality that exists in copyright law44 creates 
another hurdle for the protection of traditional cultural expressions within 
this system.  Indian copyright statutes do not define the term “originality;” 
however, judicial opinions indicate that copyright’s standard of originality 
relates to the expression of creative thought, and not to the thought itself.45  
While qualification as an “original composition” does not entail confining 
the work to a field that has not been traversed hitherto by any other person, 
such work must not appear to be copied from another work, and must 
clearly originate from the author.46 
However, any form of folklore usually draws from pre-existing tradition 
                                                          
 43. Id. 
 44. India Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957; India Code (1957) § 13.1. 
 45. See 9 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND ¶ 831 (Butterworths, 4th ed. 1973) 
(“Copyright Acts are not concerned with the originality of ideas, but with the 
expression of thought”); see also R.G. Anand v. M/S. Deluxe Films, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 
1613, 1618; Univ. of London Press, Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press, Ltd. [1916] 2 Ch. 601, 
608 (U.K.). 
 46. Univ. of London Press, [1916] 2 Ch. at 609. 
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and, in fact, folkloric works fundamentally are based on, and gain value 
from, the transmission of themes from one generation to another.  Unlike 
the testing for novelty in patent law, the requirement of originality for 
copyright protection is significantly more complex to establish.  Generally, 
courts seek to determine two factors: first, the work must emanate from the 
author and not be a copy,47 and second, the author must have exercised a 
modicum of “skill, judgment or labor in making the compilation.”48 
Nonetheless, these tests cannot be applied universally, and the 
requirement of originality operates differently in the context of artistic 
works, where it would be “palpably erroneous” to apply the “skill, labor 
and judgment” standard.49  When measured against the foregoing analysis, 
it appears that indigenous cultural expressions may not meet the traditional 
requirement of originality of expression as it is understood under classic 
copyright law.  For instance, depictions of events and characters drawn 
from Hindu mythology form recurring themes in most Madhubani 
paintings in India.  The expression of these themes, for which protection is 
sought under copyright law, involves the use of specific techniques 
common to all Madhubani artists, techniques that characterize Madhubani 
art and impart to it its exotic uniqueness. 
Madhubani, which literally means “forest of honey,” is a small village in 
India in the northern part of the eastern state of Bihar.  The distinctive 
painting style developed by local indigenous artists from that area came to 
be known by the same name.50  The painters use a completely natural 
process involving paper treated with cow dung and natural colors. 
Most Madhubani painters are women, and it is through these paintings 
that they keep alive their unique local customs, folklore, and traditions.51  
Women across castes create these paintings, which has given rise to 
distinctive schools within the Madhubani community—such as Brahmin, 
Kayasth, and Tattoo, each of which has its peculiar color schemes, motifs, 
and formats.52 
                                                          
 47. See id. (explaining that the Copyright Acts require that a work originates from 
the author). 
 48. Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 All E.R. 465, 
469 (H.L. 1964). 
 49. Interlego A.G. v. Tyco Indus. Inc., [1989] A.C. 217 (P.C. 1988) (appeal taken 
from H.K.). 
 50. See generally YVES VÉQUAUD, THE WOMEN PAINTERS OF MITHILA (Thames & 
Hudson 1977) (providing a detailed history of Madhubani art); MULK RAJ ANAND, 
MADHUBANI PAINTING (Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Gov’t of India 1984). 
 51. See JYOTINDRA JAIN, GANGA DEVI: TRADITION AND EXPRESSION IN MITHILA 
PAINTING 9 (Grantha Corp. 1997) (discussing prominent women artists who gained 
repute for creating Madhubani paintings on paper including Ganga Devi, Mahasundari 
Devi, Sita Devi, and Bani Devi). 
 52. See VÉQUAUD, supra note 50, at 25-31 (noting the differential use of colors that 
distinguishes the work of women from different castes).  The tradition of one Indian 
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The art is intertwined with the religious beliefs of the communities as the 
paintings originally were created exclusively by women on the mud walls 
and floors of their homes during various auspicious occasions, mainly 
wedding ceremonies.  It was only later, around 1966-1968, that women 
began to commercialize their art.53  Women started painting on handmade 
paper, which was easily available, and the commercial potential of 
Madhubani gradually was realized.54 
Because the Madhubani technique primarily involves the use of line 
drawings filled in with natural dyes, such designs are comparatively easy to 
replicate.  For this reason, cheap copies of such paintings made on plain 
paper with chemical color have flooded the market, to the extent that they 
are now even replicated on a variety of household goods and apparel.  
These copies are painted by anyone but the authentic Madhubani women 
painters, and in some cases are machine-printed and mass-produced.  Yet 
even as their cultural expressions are expropriated and exploited in the 
market, the original Madhubani women remain unknown, with no legal 
claim over their intellectual property and no legal recourse to prevent the 
wrongful commercial exploitation thereof. 
C.  Fixation and Moral Rights 
Copyright laws preclude copyright protection for oral works, which can 
only be granted when the work is “fixed” in material or tangible form.55  
But many forms of TCEs exist only in the form of the collective memory of 
indigenous groups—e.g., folk songs and folktales.  Although the real 
                                                          
caste, the Kayastha, consists of paintings in just black or deep red, which is the unique 
feature of this school.  Id.  The Kayastha style basically emerged from the practice of 
creating elaborate wall paintings in nuptial chambers.  Id.  Traditional motifs include 
representations of the lotus plant, bamboo grove, fish, tortoises, parrots, birds, and all 
that symbolize fertility.  Id.  Even when conceived on paper, single color line work 
continues to define the Kayastha style of painting today.  Id.  Unlike the Kayastha, the 
Brahmin style of painting deals lavishly with a rich variety of colors.  Id.  As the 
uppermost caste, their easy access to sacred Hindu literature enables the rich portrayal 
of Hindu iconography and mythology.  Id.  The Brahmin tradition mainly deals with 
themes of gods and goddesses and magical symbols connected with deities.  Id.  This 
school usually uses pigments on paper for their art.  Id.  The Tattoo-based paintings 
reflect a more primitive art and create impact by a serial replication of the same image.  
Id.  The painting is originally in the form of a line-drawing and is divided into several 
horizontal margins.  Id. 
 53. See JAIN, supra note 51, at 24. 
 54. Id. at 31. 
 55. See, e.g., India Copyright Act, No. 14 (1957); India Code ch. 1 § 2(h) (1957) 
(recognizing a fixation requirement by implication in defining “dramatic work” as “any 
piece for recitation, choreographic work or entertainment in dumb show, the scenic 
arrangement or acting form of which is fixed in writing or otherwise . . .”) (emphasis 
added); see also id. Ch. 1 § 2(p) (defining “musical work” as “a work consisting of 
music and includes any graphical notation of such work but does not include any words 
or any action intended to be sung, spoken or performed with the music”) (emphasis 
added). 
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content of the song or stories is relatively unchanged through generations, 
it does not have any fixed form.  These oral works present another inherent 
contradiction with modern copyright because one of the central tenets of 
copyright law is that ideas and themes are not protected, but only the 
expression thereof.56  Nor are artistic techniques protected by copyright.57  
The Madhubani painting style or the special stitching technique of the 
kantha weavers cannot be afforded copyright protection under the domestic 
copyright law of India. 
The problems posed by the fixation requirement in the copyright regime 
are illustrated most starkly through cases of folk music expropriation.  In 
1954, the International Folk Music Council defined folk music on the basis 
of three principles identified by Cecil Sharp, evolving from the properties 
of oral transmission.  The factors that determine the tradition of folk music 
are (1) continuity of the present with the past, (2) variation emanating from 
the creativity of the individual or group, and (3) selection by the 
community that determines the forms in which the music develops.58 
India has a rich repertoire of folk music, evident from the sheer variety 
of musical forms in each region of India.  Nearly all of the traditional and 
indigenous Indian communities have their own distinct musical genre, 
deriving unique characteristics from language, specific expressions, 
themes, use of musical instruments, and musical styles.  The distinctiveness 
of folk songs derives from their regional specificity.  Particular ethnic 
groups within a geographical location have their own dialect, intonation, 
and music style.  Folk songs are created most often by the community as a 
whole and are not authored by an individual. 
There are two distinctive features of folk music: first, the lyrics and the 
music of a song are set by the same person, and second, the music is 
essentially communitarian.  Folk songs are ever changing, but this change 
must be brought about by the community itself, not by urban outsiders, 
because the latter might lead to the distortion of such music.  For example, 
folk music uses certain instruments, and if they are changed to render the 
                                                          
 56. This principle can be traced back to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880), and is embodied today in the U.S. COPYRIGHT 
ACT, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  On this point, the Supreme Court of India observed 
that there can be no copyright protection for an idea, subject matter, thesis, plot, or 
historical or legendary facts, and infringement of copyright in such cases is confined to 
the form, manner, arrangement, and expression of the idea by the author of the 
copyright protected work.  See R.G. Anand v. M/S. Deluxe Films, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 
1613. 
 57. See Interlego A.G. v. Tyco Indus. Inc., [1989] A.C. 217 (P.C. 1988) (appeal 
taken from H.K.) (holding that a piece must emanate from the author, and bear a 
minimum amount of skill, labor, or judgment in order to meet the requirements of 
“originality”). 
 58. H. BISWAS, LOK SANGIT SAMIKSHA: BANGLA O ASSAM 33 (A. Mukherjee & 
Company Private Ltd. 1978). 
14
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol16/iss2/2
    
2008] NAMING THE UNNAMED 271 
music urban and sophisticated, the rural flavor of such songs is distorted.59 
While each region has distinctive forms, there is no watertight divide and, 
more often than not, songs sung in one part of the region spread over time 
to other neighboring areas.  Various subtle changes occur in this process of 
cultural exchange and assimilation, as most folk songs do not follow strict 
codes of grammar and composition.  Folk music thus reflects peoples’ lives 
in all its shades, as well as the fluidity of culture. 
Baul, Bhatiali, Bhawaiya, Jhumur, and Chotka are just a few among the 
many musical forms that exist in the region of Bengal alone, and further 
stylistic variations are found within each form.  Baul songs are some of the 
most popular folk songs prevalent in West Bengal and Bangladesh.  Bauls 
are a syncretic religious sect and come from the lower castes of Bengal.  
Their songs use symbolism and have mainly a devotional character.  The 
Baul is like a wandering mendicant who goes around for alms.  The songs 
reflect spiritual quests and are a medium through which the Baul seeks 
salvation.  Even the love songs express more spiritual, rather than sensual, 
love.60 
Primarily the fishing communities of Bengal and Bangladesh sing 
Bhatiali.  They are songs of everyday joys and woes.  Though it is sung in 
these areas, the form, style, and intonation of the singing vary from one 
locality to another, exemplifying the rich variation that exists in each genre 
of folk music.61 
Bhawaiya is prevalent in the Goalpara district of Assam, a northeastern 
state of India; Jalpaiguri, Cooch Bihar, and West Dinajpur of West Bengal; 
and the Rongpur, Dinajpur, and Mymensingh districts of Bangladesh.  
Sorrow and pain of separation from loved ones are the central themes of 
Bhawaiya songs.  The rhythm of Bhawaiya is always very slow, and the 
tune reflects the heart-wrenching pain of a woman separated from her 
lover, which becomes the identifiable feature of these kinds of songs.  
While most songs revolve around extramarital love, some songs also reflect 
the woman’s love for her husband. 
Like most folk music, the songs spread and develop through oral 
transmission.  Parts of one song are added to another, or a particular song is 
changed or expanded.62  Jhumur songs, originally evolving from the Oraon 
and Munda tribal communities of the Chotanagpur region of eastern India, 
are very popular.  Jhumur is also sung by the Oraon, Munda, Bhumija, and 
Santhal tribals who worked as plantation laborers in the tea gardens of 
                                                          
 59. Id. at 17-21. 
 60. Sanat Kumar Bose, Băul Songs of Bengal, 1 FOLKMUSIC & FOLKLORE 46, 48 
(1967). 
 61. BISWAS, supra note 58, at 19. 
 62. See generally H. PAL, UTTAR BANGLAR LOKGEETI (Sanyal & Company 1973). 
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Assam in eastern India, established by the British during the colonial 
period.  Accompanied by dance, these songs, with their fast rhythms, are 
very popular even today, and many different variations of Jhumur are 
prevalent.63  Chotka songs are based on fast rhythms and the themes are 
mainly of humor, satire, and fun.  They have a huge appeal in traditional 
communities.64 
Folk music is a reflection of the culture and development of any society.  
For example, in patriarchal societies, women have very little say in 
decision-making.  Their interests and opinions are marginalized 
continuously.  A number of folk songs in eastern India often reflect these 
conditions.  Sung from the perspective of a woman, these songs of love, 
separation, and desire to fulfill an extramarital love affair protest against 
patriarchal norms.65  The extramarital relations symbolize freedom from 
strict social constraints. 
While they are not a direct criticism of patriarchy, the love songs, in both 
their erotic and non-erotic forms, are definitely a subversion of established 
social normative values.  However, few songs directly criticize the Hindu 
female mythical figures of Sita, Sati, and Savitri, who are held in high 
esteem for their archetypal roles as the ideal wife.  Furthermore, not all 
love songs sung by women in this region of India revolve around 
extramarital love.  There are some very passionate songs that reflect a 
wife’s deep love for her husband.66 
Though both women and men practice folk music, there are specific 
songs sung only by women during various festivals and ceremonies.  
Wedding ceremonies are a major occasion when women in groups create 
songs.  Women also create lyrics, set the tune, and sing various songs 
during harvest seasons; these harvest season songs are mainly religious, 
invoking the nature gods for better fertility and harvest.  Songs of Hukum 
Deo, or “worship,” are sung to invoke the rain god during times of drought 
when women congregate in open fields and dance nude, their gestures 
symbolic of the acts of sexual intercourse.  The KatiPuja worship is 
another ceremony to pray to the gods for begetting male sons as well as a 
better harvest.  Women exclusively perform all of these songs and male 
entry is barred.67  A number of songs also reflect women’s protest against 
the practice of giving dowry to the bridegroom during a wedding.  The 
articulation of protest by women against the institution of marriage takes 
                                                          
 63. BISWAS, supra note 58, at 85. 
 64. H. Chakraborty, Introduction to H. Pal, supra note 62, xiv. 
 65. J. BAGCHI, ITIHASHER BIKKHANE: COOCH BIHAR O GOALPARAR LOKSANGEET 
162 (Raktakarabi 2001). 
 66. K. DASGUPTA, MOR BANDHU KAJALBHOMRA 10-16 (Thema 2007). 
 67. BAGCHI, supra note 65, at 162-64. 
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the form of complaints and condemnation of the bride against her parents, 
the pain of being separated from the natal family on marriage, the sense of 
being cheated when a young girl is married off to an old man, the distress 
of a newly wed bride in her new home.68  Mainstream culture realizes the 
enormous market potential for such music and the folk music industry now 
has quite a lucrative market in India.  While both men and women folk 
singers are not given their due recognition, the plight of women singers is 
far more pervasive.  Several singers and music bands collect these songs, 
and within a short span of time they are on the market with glossy CDs and 
funky visual albums. Copyright laws in India provide no protection against 
such misappropriation.69  Phrases are changed, new rhythms are set, 
modifications are made, and the original music is repackaged in a new but 
identifiable form. 
While similar processes of exchange and fusion of music take place the 
world over, the case of folk music misappropriation is significantly 
different because of the multiple levels at which exploitation takes place.  
Like several other TCEs in India, folk music originated in agrarian 
economies, reflecting the lifestyles and concerns of the laboring masses.  
While modern capitalism is not regarded as the ideal context for folk music 
to develop and prosper, the folk music industry today seems to have a 
strong hold in popular culture.  From mainstream cinema to the urban folk 
bands, the use of folk themes and music is made blatantly without any 
recognition to the communities who developed the same.  This has led to 
the generation of what Eisler calls the “false folk music.”70  While the 
genuine folk music was created several centuries ago by people themselves, 
the false folk music arose much later in capitalism, and failed to reflect the 
pleasure, pain, and struggle of the masses.  Rather, the modern 
entertainment industry “borrowed” the idiom of such music and presented 
it in a coarser and distorted form.71  Not only is this new form kitsch, most 
                                                          
 68. BAGCHI, supra note 65, at 165-67; see also DASGUPTA, supra note 65, at 10-16. 
 69. See Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. Leo Burnett (India) Pvt. Ltd., (2003) 27 PTC 81, 94 
(India) (holding that while in the case of reproduction of copyright-protected literary, 
dramatic or artistic works, the existence of minor alterations or additions by the 
defendant will not defeat the plaintiff’s claim of infringement).  However, the High 
Court of Bombay has held that the making of a film or sound recording despite 
resembling completely a copyright-protected film or sound recording, would not 
infringe copyright in the latter, provided it has not been made by a process of 
duplication, that is, by using mechanical contrivance.  Id.  Therefore, if a sound 
recording has been made by a person, mere resemblance to an earlier recording would 
not amount to infringement of the latter.  Id. 
 70. See HANNS EISLER, A REBEL IN MUSIC 98-99 (1978) (noting that there are two 
types of folk songs, genuine and false, and that the genuine folk songs have extreme 
value to a society’s culture). 
 71. See Chaplin v. Leslie Frewin (Publishers), Ltd., [1965] 3 All E.R. 764 (Ct. of 
App.) (finding that the author’s right to prevent unauthorized derivations of the work or 
adaptations that go beyond what was authorized, the “right of integrity,” has been 
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new urban folk music has destroyed the basic philosophy and spirit of the 
genuine folk music.  Several folk songs reflected struggles in addition to 
direct and indirect protests of the working populace against exploitation by 
landlords or middlemen. Recognizing its mass appeal and commercial 
worth, the urban entertainment industry has appropriated such music.  
Changes in lyrics and rhythms suited to the urban audience strip most of 
the songs of their histories and politics of struggle.  This hybridization 
fossilizes folk music because songs are no longer meant to reflect concerns 
of the traditional communities, but only to entertain. 
The point is not to oppose creativity and borrowing of musical resources 
by musicians and to reach out to a new audience in urban India.  The 
question is at what cost this is done? While the music industry reaps 
substantial profits with reinventing folk music, there is absolutely no 
recognition and acknowledgement of its sources.  Music albums often cite 
only the traditional musical form and there are no details of the community, 
artist(s), or folk history of the songs or music.  However, because the 
original folk tune or song is rarely, if ever, recorded or embodied in any 
material form, besides in the collective memory of the community that 
created it, no action can be brought under the presently existing copyright 
law of India.  In keeping with international norms, copyright law in India 
also requires that in order to be eligible for copyright protection the work 
must be fixed in material or tangible form.  Therefore, despite identifying 
the problem, folkloric rights of indigenous musicians in India cannot be 
safeguarded under the existing regime. 
This leads us to the second level of misappropriation after non-
acknowledgement, which is the absence of any economic returns to the 
community.  One could argue that because the community generates folk 
music, it is difficult if not impossible to locate specific recipients of any 
economic returns.  For example, Bhatiali is a particular genre of folk song 
that originated from the traditional fishing communities of West Bengal 
and Bangladesh.  If such a song is sung by an urban folk band or used as a 
musical score in a film, is it possible to duly distribute economic returns to 
the several fishing communities that developed it?  Understanding that, 
while determination of the community or specific recipients within it might 
be an uphill task, hardly any such effort has been evidenced in India.  Thus, 
as folk music is put to commercial use in the entertainment industry, the 
traditional and indigenous communities who are the owners of the specific 
cultural expression remain unrecognized and devoid of any material 
                                                          
judicially recognized in the United Kingdom); see also Pasterfield v. Denham, [1999] 
F.S.R. 168, 179 (CC (Plymouth)) (U.K.) (stating that to succeed in a claim for 
derogatory treatment of a work, the author must establish that the treatment accorded to 
the work was a distortion or mutilation that prejudices the reputation of the author; it is 
insufficient that the author is merely aggrieved by such treatment). 
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returns. 
Finally, at the third level is the question of moral rights violation.72  It is 
not enough to pay monetary compensation to the community—which is 
hardly ever done, in any case—and then use their music indiscriminately. 
There is a need to delineate the difference between improvisation of folk 
and its distortion. As discussed earlier, to de-historicize and deny the 
fluidity of folk music is tantamount to distortion. The urban middle class 
audience appreciates such music as presented to them in its new form and 
package but they hardly have any links, a sense of belonging or resonance, 
with the traditional communities who evolved the music. Thus, traditional 
or indigenous communities remain the exotic “other,” the faceless masses 
with whom the urban elite or middle class have no connection. This 
disjunction between people and their culture is dehumanizing and raises 
ethical questions. Is it not an imperative on the part of the music industry to 
protect the cultural and intellectual property of traditional and indigenous 
communities, and to morally and materially recognize their contribution to 
our rich musical folklore notwithstanding the several hurdles in the social 
and legal determination of such communities? 
D.  Duration of Protection 
In determining the duration of protection, copyright law seeks to balance 
two public interests.  The first is encouraging innovation through the 
creation of new works, while the second involves making such works 
accessible to the public to the widest possible extent, thus implying that the 
work in due course should fall into the public domain.73  Traditionally, the 
term of copyright protection for a work covered by the law varies among 
jurisdictions, but is normally life and an additional fifty to seventy years.74  
It is pertinent to note that the period of protection as well as the way in 
which the term of protection is calculated changes according to the nature 
                                                          
 72. See India Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957; India Code (1957), § 57(a)-(b) 
(recognizing the moral rights of the author of a work, through the rights of paternity 
and integrity, and allowing an author: (1) to claim authorship of the work; and (2) to 
restrain or claim damages in respect of any distortion, mutilation, modification, or other 
act in relation to the work which is done before the expiration of the term of the 
copyright, if such distortion is prejudicial to the honor or reputation of such author). 
 73. See LIONEL BENTLEY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 142-
46 (2d ed. 2004). 
 74. See India Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957; India Code (1957), §§ 22-29 
(prescribing the term of protection for each kind of work: in case of literary, dramatic, 
musical, or artistic work (other than a photograph), when published within the lifetime 
of the author, copyright subsists during the lifetime of the author until sixty years from 
the beginning of the calendar year next following the year in which the author dies; in 
cases of anonymous works and posthumous works, the term is sixty years from the 
beginning of the calendar year next following the year in which the work is first 
published). 
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of the work in question.  This is a reflection of the fact that different 
interests and policy concerns arise with different categories of works.  
However, considering the cultural and religious significance of ancestral 
indigenous designs and folklore, which have been created through 
thousands of years of accumulated knowledge, this is an entirely 
insignificant duration. As a consequence of this limitation in copyright law, 
members of traditional communities responsible for developing and 
sustaining expressions of folklore like kantha-stitch, Madhubani art, or folk 
music, who in the traditional context would be the owner of such cultural 
property, gradually are becoming culturally dispossessed and impoverished 
to the point that they may even need to seek permission to use or have 
access to traditional cultural expressions once owned or created by their 
ancestors.75  Therefore, it is apparent that the existing regime of intellectual 
property protection is insufficient to safeguard traditional cultural 
expressions, keeping in mind the socio-cultural variations between the 
Western and indigenous communities in mind. 
IV. RECOGNIZING WOMEN’S INTERESTS WITHIN TRADITIONAL 
COMMUNITIES: THE INDIAN CONTEXT 
This section analyzes the extent to which intellectual property and 
human rights laws protect interests, rights, and control of women over their 
cultural property.  Cultural feminism argues that there are differences 
between the masculine and feminine ways of reasoning.76 According to 
Donovan, contemporary cultural feminists believe that women’s world 
views create the basis for a more humane collective world view that can 
resist destructive and individualistic masculine ideologies.77  Shiva argues 
that women in India are connected intrinsically to nature and are the 
providers of sustenance.  Their role in preserving nature and acting as 
caregivers to the community has a historical and cultural, not merely a 
biological, basis.78  Contemporary cultural feminism is far more 
sophisticated and has moved far beyond the assumption of a reformist and 
pacifist nature of women as understood by the nineteenth century cultural 
feminists.79  In the legal context, cultural feminism calls for the 
                                                          
 75. See, e.g., Puri, supra note 32, at 526-27 (highlighting the problems caused by 
the limited copyright protection that dispossesses descendents of their ancestors’ 
creations as a reason to extend copyright protection in perpetuity). 
 76. REBECCA COOK, HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 5-6 (1994). 
 77. See JOSEPHINE DONOVAN, FEMINIST THEORY: THE INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS 
77 (Continuum Int’l Publishing, 3d ed. 2000) (1985). 
 78. VANDANA SHIVA, THE WOMEN, GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT READER 62 
(Nalini Visvanathan ed., Zed Books 1997). 
 79. See DONOVAN, supra note 77, at 77. 
20
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol16/iss2/2
    
2008] NAMING THE UNNAMED 277 
identification of a distinctive women’s voice and a re-evaluation of the 
contribution it can make to legal doctrine.80  Such an approach enables the 
law to move beyond a formal non-discrimination model and recognize 
women’s differential location in society.  This celebration of differences, 
however, may lead to a marginalization of women’s rights.  On one hand it 
can lead to a reassertion of women’s location in the private sphere, but on 
the other it can mean that their needs are different from men and hence 
entitled to lesser resources.  The creation of a specialized branch of 
“women’s rights” within human rights discourse has also led to a 
ghettoization of women’s rights as “mainstream” human rights law tends to 
ignore a gendered understanding of human rights violations or fails to 
apply human rights norms to condemn atrocities against women.81 
The previous sections have demonstrated the lack of any domestic legal 
regime in India that could protect the cultural rights of traditional and 
indigenous communities.  It is further argued that even if the intellectual 
property rights regime protected TCEs, traditional knowledge and cultural 
expressions of women would still remain unrecognized.  The reason is two-
fold.  A feminist understanding of traditional and rural Indian communities 
would reveal their patriarchal nature. Elderly males represent most 
communities in India, silencing women’s voices and undermining their 
contributions.  Women’s cultural expressions have no specific recognition 
within the communities.  Within the traditional communities of eastern 
India, the kantha industry is conceived merely as a workable employment 
avenue and not necessarily a cultural expression protected and developed 
by women.  On the other hand, Madhubani and women’s folk music is 
simply symbolic of women’s participation in the religious and cultural life 
of the community and considered as a “natural” extension of their gendered 
roles.  Communities may be unprepared to accord the status of artists to 
their women.  Coupled with a patriarchal social set up, the world view of a 
communitarian existence is in conflict with the idea of individual 
recognition, more so when the recipients of such recognition are women.  
This is not to deny that over a course of time, with some state intervention 
to protect the rich cultural heritage of several communities in India, a few 
women have been recognized as Madhubani artists or folk singers.  But on 
the whole women’s contribution to the protection and maintenance of 
                                                          
 80. Hilary Charlesworth, What Are “Women’s International Human Rights”?, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 65 
(Rebecca Cook ed., 1994) (stating that this area of legal feminism is the counterpart for 
other disciplines, such as feminist theology and women’s literature). 
 81. See HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 218 (2000) (highlighting that the 
specialization of women’s rights within the field of human rights has made protection 
of women a lower priority in the mainstream human rights discourse). 
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cultural heritage is not given its due recognition.  In such a scenario, if 
intellectual property rights seem to be a solution, the feasibility and 
suitability of such a regime does remain a question.  Even if the intellectual 
property rights regime ensured economic returns to the community, women 
would have little control over the economic benefits in a deeply 
hierarchical and patriarchal society. 
Secondly, intellectual property regimes are often based on values of 
individualism and competition operating primarily in a market economy. 
Often understood as masculine values, most women, especially in rural 
India, would hardly subscribe to these values and would not possibly think 
of using the law upholding individual or corporate claims to protect their 
individual rights. To use a cultural feminist approach, in a cultural context 
where women’s lives are primarily relational, an individualistic claim over 
resources is perhaps not the ideal mechanism to acknowledge and 
safeguard the contributions and interests of women within their 
communities. Presently there is no recognition of authorship, authenticity, 
and economic returns to the community within the existing intellectual 
property regime in India. Even if India created a workable intellectual 
property regime protecting such traditional cultural expressions by 
establishing a moral obligation on part of individuals and companies that 
use TCEs, it is doubtful whether women would benefit from such legal 
developments. Even if we assume that a strong intellectual property regime 
would ensure economic returns to the community, there is little guarantee 
that women would be able to control the process. 
A human rights perspective is better equipped to recognize the 
economic, social, and cultural rights of indigenous peoples and traditional 
artisan communities than a narrow framework of intellectual property 
rights.  Traditional and indigenous communities in India face double 
marginalization due to the lack of any intellectual property regime 
protecting traditional knowledge and cultural expressions and the non-
recognition of indigenous populations by the Indian state.  For women, the 
marginalization greatly increases.  While the intellectual property regime 
has limited applicability in the protection of women’s cultural expressions, 
the mainstream human rights framework also fails to reflect a gender 
perspective; as a result the interests of women in indigenous communities 
are neglected even further.  Traditional human rights law is based on a 
formal non-discrimination model that does not take the structural 
disadvantages of women into account.  Human rights law has been 
primarily operative in the public sphere while most women’s lives take 
place in the private sphere where significant human rights violations take 
place, resulting in a lack of understanding of the systemic nature of 
subordination of women in human rights law.  This failure to characterize 
the subordination of women as a human rights violation leads to a 
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lackadaisical approach on the part of the State to condemn discrimination 
against women.82  Feminists have argued that while advocacy and 
campaigns for legal rights is an important strategy, it is imperative to go 
beyond this demand and address structural inequalities of power.  
Charlesworth argues 
women’s experiences and concerns are not easily translated in to the 
narrow, individualistic language of rights; rights discourse overly 
simplifies complex power relations and their promise may be thwarted 
by structural inequalities of power; the balancing of “competing” rights 
by decision-making bodies often reduces women’s power . . . .83 
According to Coomaraswamy, the women’s rights discourse in south 
Asia is weak.  Poor implementation coupled with a lack of awareness 
prevents the rights machinery from becoming a viable tool for the 
empowerment of women.84  More importantly, rights discourse is often 
considered to be a Western hegemonizing dialogue and has little resonance 
in the cultural context of south Asian societies.  International debates over 
universality of rights language between the global north and certain 
countries of south Coomaraswamy warns us against the “orientalist trap” of 
two kinds of binaries—the first is that of the progressive, individualistic 
West vis-à-vis the backward East and the second is the reverse argument of 
the communitarian, non-adversarial and therefore superior Eastern cultures 
that do not uphold individualistic concepts of rights.  Coomaraswamy 
asserts that the prevalence of both traditions of mediation and 
reconciliation, as well as adversarial systems in South Asian societies85 go 
a long way to strengthen a culture of women’s rights.  However, in a 
context where there is ideological and social resistance to “rights culture,” 
articulating social and economic demands in terms of rights might be 
extremely difficult for women.  All these factors are impediments in 
claiming moral and material returns for cultural creativity of women.  For 
women who create the kantha, Madhubani, or folk music, these 
expressions are intrinsic to their survival as a community. Individual 
                                                          
 82. See DONOVAN, supra note 77, at 4-15; see also Charlesworth, supra note 80, at 
60-64 (arguing that the formulation of equal rights may be a useful first step towards 
improving the position of women). 
 83. See Charlesworth, supra note 80, at 61 (stating that a continuing focus on 
achieving more rights may not be beneficial to women due to androcentic 
construction). 
 84. See Radhika Coomaraswamy, To Bellow Like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and 
the Discourse of Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 41-42 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (remarking that it is 
important to adapt international conventions so they resonate with the anthropological 
reality in Asian societies so they can be used to improve the rights of women). 
 85. See id. (identifying that the approach to women’s rights is often couched in 
ambiguity in the Asian world by both assuming and denying responsibility for the 
mistreatment of women at the same time). 
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recognition as artists is often inconceivable for these women.  The point is 
not to argue for individual artistic recognition, but to realize the worth and 
potential of women as chief custodians and creators of traditional cultural 
expressions that is undermined by the patriarchal societal structures of the 
family and community,  the market that expropriates traditional knowledge 
and cultural expressions, and finally the mainstream legal system that 
remain gender insensitive in its garb of gender neutrality. 
For many poor indigenous communities in India, life is an everyday 
struggle for survival. In a situation of complete absence of intellectual 
property laws, expropriation of their knowledge and cultural expressions 
has absolutely no legal remedy.  Establishing an intellectual property 
regime that would adequately protect these communities is necessary.  But 
a mere set of new laws would be of little relevance without an in-depth 
understanding of the power dynamics in society.  An intellectual property 
regime tailor-made for the benefit of corporations is incapable of protecting 
indigenous rights.  Incorporation of a human rights perspective within the 
intellectual property regime is essential if the rights of traditional and 
indigenous communities are to be upheld.  However, as argued earlier, 
neither regime reflect a gendered understanding.  While some feminist 
critiques of the rights discourse are available,86 “mapping the 
connections”87 between gender and intellectual property is rare.  Therefore, 
it is not enough to simply argue for the creation of an intellectual property 
regime in India, but to first assess its ability to adequately protect rights of 
traditional and indigenous communities.  It is also important to understand 
the multiple layers of exploitation within the family, the community, by the 
state, and by the market that prevent women from claiming social, 
economic, and cultural rights.  This is not to imply that rural and 
indigenous women are victims without any agency, but to recognize the 
wide gap between the existing intellectual property and human rights 
regimes, and their dissonance with the experiences in which women live 
their lives. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The international intellectual property regime in place today reflects a 
purely Western understanding of authorship and ownership of intellectual 
property, valuing individual rights above collective or group rights.  It is 
based entirely on Anglo-Saxon principles, consequently seeking to ensure 
economic interests at the cost of cultural interests.  Domestic legislations 
                                                          
 86. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 84; GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Karen Knop ed., 2004). 
 87. See “IP/Gender: The Unmapped Connections,” Conference held  by the 
American University, Washington College of Law (Mar. 2007). 
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based on this system are similarly ill-equipped at ensuring the protection of 
TCEs within the national framework.  In the Indian context, the Copyright 
Act of 1957 is conceptually inadequate to secure the intellectual property 
rights of traditional communities that are repositories of folklore, and is 
failing miserably in protecting these communities from daily expropriation 
of their cultural and intellectual property.  In light of the blank canvas that 
presently exists in the area of statutory protection of folklore in India, 
specific legislation to safeguard traditional knowledge and traditional 
cultural expressions is essential. 
However, the creation of a regulatory framework in the statute books is 
merely the first step of many.  The establishment of an effective 
institutional framework accompanied by widespread societal change is 
needed if traditional communities like the kantha weavers, Madhubani 
painters, or custodians of folk music are to be accorded meaningful 
protection within the Indian legal system, particularly in cases where the 
rights of women are at stake.  For this, there is an urgent need to set up an 
autonomous institution in India with members ranging from art experts, 
academicians, policy consultants, lawyers, women, and human rights 
activists to members from civil society who could draw up a holistic plan 
with a gender focus to protect economic and cultural rights of traditional 
communities, with specific reference to women.  Neither the state nor the 
private players in the national and global markets could be expected to 
honestly and efficiently uphold and entrench such rights. 
Guaranteeing economic and social rights for women is crucial to the 
survival of traditional artisan communities and the folkloric works they 
develop and maintain.  Further, it is important to make the linkages 
between the intellectual property rights of authorship and recognition of 
TCEs specifically created and sustained by women and the economic 
benefits that could accrue to women through such recognition.  As has 
emerged clearly from this paper, neither the intellectual property regime 
nor the human rights discourse can, in isolation, provide a tailor-made 
solution to prevent exploitation of traditional communities.  The 
intellectual property regime in its present form entirely excludes the human 
rights paradigm, while the human rights discourse, in turn, remains male-
centric, thereby failing to protect the interests of women within indigenous 
communities.  It is essential, therefore, to develop an intellectual property 
regime that incorporates a gendered human rights discourse to ensure the 
economic and social empowerment of women in such communities. 
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